IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps)

Executive Summary:

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is tasked with preserving the Islamic Republic of Iran and the ideals of the 1979 revolution. The IRGC combines traditional military roles with a relentless focus on supposed domestic enemies. The IRGC is Iran’s primary instrument for exporting the ideology of the Islamic Revolution worldwide. It is rigidly loyal to Iran’s clerical elite. The IRGC is Iran’s main link to its terrorist proxies, which the regime uses to boost Iran’s global influence.

Within the IRGC are the Basij militia and the Quds Force (IRGC-QF). The Basij, literally “mobilization,” is a paramilitary organization charged with channeling popular support for the Iranian regime. The Basij is famous for its recruitment of volunteers, many of them teenage children, for human wave attacks during the Iran-Iraq war. Today, the Basij has two missions: to provide defensive military training to protect the regime against foreign invasion, and to suppress domestic anti-regime activity through street violence and intimidation.  After the contested 2009 Iranian presidential elections, for example, the Basij brutally quashed protests and attacked student dormitories.

The IRGC’s Quds Force specializes in foreign missions, providing training, funding and weapons to extremist groups, including Iraqi insurgents, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The Quds Force allegedly participated in the 1994 suicide bombing of an Argentine Jewish community center, killing more than 80 and wounding about 300. In the years since, the Quds Force has armed anti-government militants in Bahrain, and assisted in a 2011 assassination attempt on Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States. The Quds Force also plays a key role in support of Syrian regime forces in that country’s civil war.

Domestically, the IRGC exerts political and economic control throughout Iran. In April 2021, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif complained in an interview the IRGC had more influence in foreign affairs and the country’s nuclear dossier than him. Zarif alleged he had “zero” influence over Iran’s foreign policy and had “never been able to tell a military commander to do something in order to aid diplomacy.”“In leaked recording, Iran’s Zarif criticises Guards’ influence in diplomacy,” Reuters, April 26, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/leaked-recording-irans-zarif-criticises-guards-influence-diplomacy-2021-04-26/. Through a network of linked front companies, the IRGC has also created a dominant stake in Iran’s economic sector while exerting control over strategic industries to ensure loyalty to the supreme leader.

Doctrine:

The IRGC is an Iranian government agency tasked with defending the regime against internal and external threats. Espousing a radical ideology and a paranoid worldview, the IRGC uses secret police methods against its opponents within Iran, and terrorist tactics against its enemies abroad.

Iranian law defines the IRGC as “an institution commanded by the Supreme Leader whose purpose is to protect the Islamic Revolution of Iran and its accomplishments, while striving continuously . . . to spread the sovereignty of God’s law.”“Statute of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Islamic Revolution,” Islamic Parliament Research Center, ratified September 6, 1982, article 1, http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90595.

In the first months after the 1979 Iranian revolution, before its existence was enshrined in law, the IRGC operated as a network of militant activists loyal to revolutionary leader Ruhollah Khomeini. In this role, the IRGC helped to stamp out dissident currents within the revolutionary movement.Afshon P. Ostover, Guardians of the Islamic Revolution: Ideology, Politics, and the Development of Military Power in Iran, 1979-2009, University of Michigan, 2009, 50-52. The IRGC views its task as preserving the “Islamic republican” form of government created by Khomeini, and faithfully implementing the instructions of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini after the latter’s death in 1989. Ahead of Iran’s June 2013 presidential elections, IRGC commanders reportedly made clear through public statements that they would only confirm a president who is loyal to Khamenei.Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Iran Guards Wield Electoral Power behind Scenes,” Reuters, June 4, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/04/us-iran-election-guards-idUSBRE9530V120130604.

The IRGC today enjoys the power of a government agency, while still maintaining the zeal and fanaticism of an ideologically motivated terrorist group. The IRGC’s mission combines traditional military roles with a relentless focus on pursuing supposed domestic enemies. According to the Ministry of Defense, the IRGC’s role is to “protect [Iran’s] independence, territorial integrity, and national and revolutionary ideals, under the shadow of the orders given by the Commander in Chief, the Grand Ayatollah Imam Khamenei.”“Statement of the Ministry of Defense on the Anniversary of the Founding of the IRGC,” ISNA, April 21, 2014, http://bit.ly/1qFjx84. Political beliefs considered inconsistent with “revolutionary ideals” are treated as military threats. Then-IRGC commander Jafari stated in 2014: “today’s war is not fought on land or sea, it is fought at the level of belief, and the enemy is investing efforts to gain influence inside the Islamic Republican system.”“IRGC Commander: The Corps Supports Religious Authority,” ISNA, May 24, 2014, http://bit.ly/1j4suWo.

The IRGC’s doctrine combines rigid loyalty to Iran’s clerical elite with deep paranoia about the outside world. In IRGC publications, Iran is portrayed as threatened by American and “Zionist” plots, which are said to be capable of exerting great influence within Iran. Allegations of foreign meddling in Iran provide the justification for terrorism abroad, fueling the high-profile international conflicts that provide the basis for ever harsher crackdowns on internal dissent. The IRGC considers “resistance” to Israel and support for so-called resistance groups among its primary regional goals. IRGC propaganda refers to Israel as a conspiracy against the region backed by the United States and the United Kingdom.“IRGC: Iran-Led Resistance Strategy Will Speed Up Collapse of ‘Israel’, Liberation of Quds,” Al-Manar TV, May 21, 2020, https://english.almanar.com.lb/1040800. Through its support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terror groups, the IRGC leads what it calls a regional axis of resistance to “speed up the downfall” of Israel and “the liberation of al-Quds,” the Arabic name for Jerusalem.“IRGC: Iran-led resistance strategy will speed up collapse of Israel, liberation of Quds,” PressTV, May 21, 2020, https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2020/05/21/625811/Iran-IRGC-Palestine-Quds-liberation-. The IRGC provides military and strategic aid to its regional proxies. In 2016, for example, the IRGC provided Hezbollah with kits to convert short-range rockets into longer-range missiles, capable of hitting strategic targets inside Israel.Robin Wright, “Iran Entrenches Its “Axis of Resistance” Across the Middle East,” New Yorker, September 20, 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/iran-entrenches-its-axis-of-resistance-across-the-middle-east.

Over time, domestic repression has come to overshadow traditional military missions, as the IRGC’s influence has spread into every aspect of Iranian life.Frederic Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica, Arlington, and Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2009), 32, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG821.pdf. In 2007, following the formal incorporation of the Basij militia into the IRGC, IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari said, “The new strategic guidelines of the IRGC have been changed by the directives of the Leader of the Revolution [i.e., Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei]. The main mission of the IRGC from now on is to deal with the threats from the internal enemies. [The number-two priority of the corps] is to help the military in case of foreign threats.”Frederic Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica, Arlington, and Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2009), 33, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG821.pdf.

The IRGC considers its loyalty to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei a religious imperative. At times, the organization’s devotion to Khamenei slips into hero-worship. In 2014, for example, deputy IRGC commander Mohammad Hejazi credited Khamenei with overruling the objections of scientific experts to direct research towards increased accuracy in ballistic missiles, “resulting in proud accomplishments in this field.”“Commander Hejazi: The Leader’s Orders Led to Increased Accuracy of Ballistic Missiles,” ISNA, April 28, 2014, http://bit.ly/1q2U6JZ.

Organizational Structure:

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

By law, the power to appoint and remove the commander of the IRGC is given to the supreme leader. “Statute of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Islamic Revolution,” Islamic Parliament Research Center, ratified September 6, 1982, article 29, http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90595. The supreme leader also appoints clerical representatives to the various units of the IRGC whose guidance and instructions are binding on commanders.“Statute of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Islamic Revolution,” Islamic Parliament Research Center, ratified September 6, 1982, article 33, http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90595. Iranian law makes “belief and practical obedience to the principle of clerical rule” a condition of membership in the IRGC, further establishing absolute loyalty to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as the IRGC’s guiding principle.“Statute of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Islamic Revolution,” Islamic Parliament Research Center, ratified September 6, 1982, article 34, http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90595.

Efforts to normalize the IRGC’s extraordinary role in Iran over the years have resulted in a complex organization chart. Administratively, the IRGC falls under the Joint Armed Forces General Staff, part of the Ministry of Defense. But these layers of oversight do not give Iran’s nominally elected civilian authorities real control over the IRGC, as the entire military remains subordinate to the Supreme National Security Council, which in turn answers to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica, Arlington, and Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2009), 9-10.

Scholars who study the IRGC have concluded that “individuals appear to matter more than institutions when considering national security decision[-]making.”Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica, Arlington, and Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2009), 11. Consequently, scholars have identified personal networks, often based on ties of family, friendship, or joint service in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War as the key factors in IRGC leadership.Will Fulton, “The IRGC Command Network: Formal Structures and Informal Influence,” American Enterprise Institute Iran Tracker, July 18, 2013, http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/fulton-irgc-command-network-july-22-2013. The opacity of the IRGC’s real command structure helps make Iran an erratic and therefore especially dangerous player in regional affairs.

Formed in 2009 on the order of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) is a domestic and international unit that targets journalists, activists, dual Iranian nationals, and others who oppose the abuses and human rights violations perpetrated by the Iranian regime. The IRGC-IO operates independently and reportedly serves as an ideological counterweight to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS), as it is under direct control of the supreme leader while MOIS is under the control of the Iranian president.Tim Arango, James Risen, Farnaz Fassihi, Ronen Bergman, and Murtaza Hussain, “The Iran Cables: Secret Documents Show How Tehran Wields Power in Iraq,” New York Times, November 19, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/18/world/middleeast/iran-iraq-spy-cables.html; Jason Brodsky, “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Intelligence Organization in Transition,” United Against Nuclear Iran, June 23, 2022, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-intelligence-organization-transition. After Mohammad Kazemi replaced Hossein Ta’eb as head of the IRGC-IO in June 2022, media reports indicated other Iranian security agencies had sought to limit the IRGC-IO’s power.“Exclusive: Other Security Chiefs In Iran Want To Limit IRGC Intelligence,” Iran International, June 24, 2022, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202206243080. With the spread of anti-regime protests in Iran in the fall of 2022, the IRGC-IO and MOIS accused foreign intelligence agencies of instigating and financing the protests.“Iran’s Intelligence Ministry, IRGC Intelligence Organization Highlight Role of Foreign Spy Agencies in Recent Riots,” Tasnim News Agency, October 29, 2022, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/10/29/2795416/iran-s-intelligence-ministry-irgc-intelligence-organization-highlight-role-of-foreign-spy-agencies-in-recent-riots. The United States sanctioned the IRGC-IO on April 27, 2023, for its role in the hostage-taking or wrongful detention of U.S. nationals in Iran.“Treasury Sanctions Officials of Iranian Intelligence Agency Responsible for Detention of U.S. Nationals in Iran,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 27, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1444. According to the U.S. Department of State, the IRGC-IO has been involved in the wrongful detention of at least one U.S. national abroad.“Sanctioning Russian Federation and Iranian State Actors Responsible for the Wrongful Detention of U.S. Nationals,” U.S. Department of State, April 27, 2023, https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-russian-federation-and-iranian-state-actors-responsible-for-the-wrongful-detention-of-u-s-nationals/.

Basij

The Basij militia, whose name means “mobilization,” is a paramilitary organization tasked with channeling popular support for the Islamic Republican regime. The Basij was created on April 30, 1980, to assist the IRGC in maintaining order.Ali Alfoneh, “The Basij Resistance Force | The Iran Primer,” U.S. Institute of Peace, October 6, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force. The Basij is most famous for its recruitment of volunteers, many of them teenage children, for human wave attacks on Iraqi forces during the Iran-Iraq War in which thousands died. Following the Iran-Iraq War, the Basij assumed a police role in Iran to maintain loyalty to the regime and suppress protests.Ali Alfoneh, “The Basij Resistance Force | The Iran Primer,” U.S. Institute of Peace, October 6, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force. Today, the Basij has two missions: giving military training to regime supporters to prepare them to resist foreign invasion, and helping suppress domestic opposition to the regime through street violence and intimidation. According to the 1980 Iranian law that created the Basij, the militia’s purpose is “to train and organize all volunteers for encountering any threat and invasion against the accomplishments of the Islamic revolution from inside and outside.”“Basij, The Oppressive Arm Of The Iranian Regime,” Radio Farda, January 4, 2018, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/basij-the-oppressive-arm-of-the-iranian-regime-/28954794.html.

The Basij presents itself as a popular volunteer association, although it is very much an organ of the state. The group’s “regular members,” said to number more than ten million, are unpaid volunteers motivated by ideological zeal or the hopes of advancement. Its “active members” receive salaries and work full time to organize the volunteer members. According to U.S. government estimates, the Basij comprise 100,000 active members, while hundreds of thousands of volunteers could be mobilized in war.“Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies,” Congressional Research Service, last updated April 29, 2020, 17, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44017. The group has been nominally subordinate to the IRGC since the early 1980s, and organizational changes in recent years have increased the IRGC’s direct control over the Basij, apparently to better manage the two groups’ repression of internal dissent.Ali Alfoneh, “The Basij Resistance Force | The Iran Primer,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed February 27, 2015, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force. The Basij were formally incorporated into the IRGC in July 2008 and report directly to the IRGC commander-in-chief.“Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies,” Congressional Research Service, last updated April 29, 2020, 17, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44017; Ali Alfoneh, “The Basij Resistance Force | The Iran Primer,” U.S. Institute of Peace, October 6, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force.

Khatam al-Anbia

Created in 1989, Iran’s Khatam al-Anbia (KAA) is an IRGC-controlled engineering firm that acts as the organization’s construction arm.Frederic Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica, Arlington, and Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2009), 60, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG821.pdf. KAA maintains more than 800 subsidiaries, collectively employing more than 40,000 people.“IRGC Campaign,” United Against Nuclear Iran,” United Against Nuclear Iran, accessed February 14, 2017, http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/irgc/. Approximately 70 percent of the firm’s business is believed to be military-related.Frederic Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica, Arlington, and Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2009), 62, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG821.pdf. KAA has played a role in building Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including the country’s nuclear facilities at Qom and Fordow.“UANI Launches World Wide Web Campaign, Calls on ICANN and RIPE to Disconnect and Cease Business with Sanctioned Iranian Entities,” United Against Nuclear Iran, September 18, 2012, http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/news/uani-launches-world-wide-web-campaign-calls-icann-and-ripe-disconnect-and-cease-business-sancti

The company has won more than 17,000 no-bid contracts from the government.“IRGC Campaign,” United Against Nuclear Iran,” accessed February 14, 2017, http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/irgc/. For example, in December 2012, KAA was reportedly set to begin construction of the “world’s tallest dam” in Iran after the government canceled a $2 billion contract with a Chinese firm and turned the project over to the IRGC.Joanna Paraszczuk, “Iran ready to construct ‘world’s tallest dam,’” Jerusalem Post, December 19, 2012, http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Iran-ready-to-construct-worlds-tallest-dam. According to United Against Nuclear Iran, “Through Khatam al-Anbia, the IRGC has succeeded in assuming a dominant role in Iran’s oil and gas industry.”“IRGC Campaign,” United Against Nuclear Iran,” accessed February 14, 2017, http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/irgc/. Khatam al-Anbia has become one of Iran’s largest contractors in industrial and development projects. In February 2022, the Iranian parliament’s Budget Reconciliation Committee announced a deal with Khatam al-Anbia to complete unfinished prayer houses in exchange for more than $477 million in crude oil.“Another Day, Another Financial Boost for the Revolutionary Guards,” Iran Wire, February 10, 2022, https://iranwire.com/en/features/11289.

Quds Force

The Quds Force (IRGC-QF) is a special branch of the IRGC tasked with achieving sensitive missions beyond Iran’s borders. The IRGC-QF has played an active role in providing training and weapons to extremist groups including Iraqi insurgents, Lebanese Hezbollah, and others. The group’s commander is Brigadier General Ismail Ghaani, who was appointed to the role after the January 3, 2020, assassination of the group’s longtime leader, Major General Qasem Soleimani.Ahmed Rasheed and Ahmed Aboulenein, “U.S. says it disrupted ‘imminent attack’ with killing of top Iran commander,” Reuters, last updated January 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blast/u-s-says-it-disrupted-imminent-attack-with-killing-of-top-iran-commander-idUSKBN1Z11K8. In addition to overseeing the group’s violent attacks, Soleimani served as an emissary of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, reportedly using a combination of violence and bribes to wield enormous influence over the politics of neighboring Iraq. He was also said to coordinate much of Iran’s support for the Ba’ath regime in the Syrian civil war.Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” New Yorker, September 30, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander.

General Hossein Hamedani, deputy commander of an IRGC volunteer unit, told an Iranian news agency in 2008 that the IRGC is providing weapons to “liberation armies” in the Middle East, including groups in Lebanon and Iraq.Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iranian General Reports Arming ‘Liberation Armies,’” USA Today, October 27, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-10-27-2687460468_x.htm. Such liaisons are the responsibility of the IRGC-QF.

Since Ghaani took control of the Quds Force, however, there have been numerous reports that he has been unable to exert the same influence over Iran’s terrorist proxies. According to media sources, Ghaani allegedly does not have the same expertise as his predecessor and does not have a rapport with Khamenei or his office—a critical element of his role as commander of the Quds Force.Martin Chulov, “Iraqi militias grow in power as Iran’s military strongman proves too weak,” Guardian, July 26, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/26/suleimani-successor-fails-to-convince-at-summit. These allegations were exacerbated following a November 7, 2021, drone attack on the Baghdad home of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Suspicions fell on Iran-backed militias, particularly Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH). The militias and Iran denied involvement in the attack, which lightly wounded Kadhimi and wounded seven members of his security detail. Ghaani visited Baghdad on November 8 and denied Tehran had any connection to the attack.Hamdi Alkhshali, “Iraqi Prime Minister survives exploding drone assassination attempt,” CNN, last updated November 8, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/06/middleeast/iraq-prime-minister-drone-attack-intl-hnk/index.html; “Iran-backed militia behind attack on Iraqi PM -security officials, sources,” Reuters, last updated November 8, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-backed-militia-behind-attack-iraqi-pm-sources-2021-11-08/; Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “Powerful Iranian general visited Iraq after attack on PM,” Associated Press, November 8, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-religion-iran-iraq-tehran-8cfe754e681581f511f430f4bd31e776. Following the attack, reports emerged of fractures between Iran and its proxies. AAH and KH have reportedly openly defied orders from Ghaani. AAH commander Qais al-Khazali and KH commander Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi allegedly told the Iranians that Tehran’s support for Kadhimi receiving a second term in Iraq’s October 2021 elections broke the allies’ bond. Some security analysts in Iraq alleged Ghaani had lost control over the Iraqi militias.Suadad al-Salhy, “Betrayed by Iran? Iraqi armed factions given ‘slap’ with Kadhimi drone attack,” Middle East Eye, November 29, 2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-iran-kadhimi-drone-attack-armed-groups-betrayed; Jared Malsin, Ghassan Adnan, and Benoit Faucon, “Iraq Struggles to Control Iran-Allied Militias Believed Responsible for Attack on Prime Minister,” Wall Street Journal, November 9, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iraq-struggles-to-control-iran-allied-militias-believed-responsible-for-attack-on-prime-minister-11636475084. On February 3, 2022, U.S. General Frank McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, declared Ghaani “does not exercise the same degree of control over Iranian-aligned militia groups” as Soleimani did.Joyce Karam, “Iran’s Quds force commander struggling to control proxy militias, top US general says,” National (Abu Dhabi), February 3, 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/us-news/2022/02/03/irans-quds-force-commander-struggling-to-control-proxy-militias-top-us-general-says/. As a result, other branches of the IRGC have reportedly taken a larger role in coordinating with Iran’s proxies.Yaakov Lappin, “Nearly two years after Soleimani assassination, IRGC takes over roles reserved for Quds Force,” Jewish News Syndicate, October 19, 2021, https://www.jns.org/nearly-two-years-after-soleimani-assassination-irgc-takes-over-roles-once-reserved-for-quds-force/.

Training and Recruitment:

General

The IRGC is the third-wealthiest organization in Iran after the National Iranian Oil Company and the Imam Reza Endowment.Hossein Aryan, "Iran's Basij Force – The Mainstay of Domestic Security,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 15, 2009,  http://www.rferl.org/content/Irans_Basij_Force_Mainstay_Of_Domestic_Security/1357081.html. Due to its vast wealth, the IRGC is able to use a very simple recruitment tactic: money. The IRGC attracts young men by paying them up to $265 a month.“Hama Media Office: IRGC Presence ‘Noticeable,’” Syria Direct, February 26, 2015, http://syriadirect.org/main/36-interviews/1857-hama-media-office-irgc-presence-noticable. In 1982, the IRGC created its first high school in Tehran to train and indoctrinate young men into the organization. The IRGC opened similar schools throughout the country. Graduates went on to join the IRGC and Basij. The program ended and the schools closed in 1999, but the IRGC announced plans in early 2015 to reopen affiliated high schools. Saeed Aganji, “IRGC to reopen its own high schools,” Al-Monitor, February 24, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/iran-irgc-sepah-high-school.html.

The Basij and Quds Force operate under the IRGC and are responsible for the bulk of the umbrella organization’s recruitment. Both groups have developed an organized method of enrollment and training. Both the Basij and the Quds Force strategically place recruiters near holy sites, mosques, schools, and community centers to attract volunteers.Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 16, 2007 http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070816_cordesman_report.pdf. The IRGC also trains foreign fighters from groups like Hezbollah and Hamas.Mark Mazzetti, “Striking Deep Into Israel, Hamas Employs an Upgraded Arsenal,” New York Times, December 31, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/01/world/middleeast/01rockets.html.

Basij

Training

The Basij is a paramilitary organization operating under the IRGC that relies heavily on volunteers as well as paid members. The Basij constitution highlights the importance of training, stating that one of the force’s most important responsibilities is to train volunteers to “defend the country and the Islamic Republic regime.”Dr. Saeid Golkar, “The Ideological-Political Training of Iran’s Basij,” Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies, September 2010, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB44.pdfl. The Basij is increasingly being used to quell internal unrest in Iran and, consequently, has become highly organized.

The Basij has an extensive membership of regular, active, and special recruits. Each classification is based on the volunteer’s level of training and, to a lesser degree, on his level of commitment.Dr. Saeid Golkar, “The Ideological-Political Training of Iran’s Basij,” Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies, September 2010, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB44.pdf.

The Basij relies heavily on Ideological-Political Trainers (IPTs) to indoctrinate and educate its fledgling members. IPTs are divided into three groups: organizational, non-organizational, and invited members. Organizational and non-organizational IPTs typically hold high school degrees, while invited trainers are usually well-connected and well-educated.Dr. Saeid Golkar, “The Ideological-Political Training of Iran’s Basij,” Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies, September 2010, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB44.pdf. Trainees are also required to attend at least 18 hours of ideological and political courses on subjects like “Major Islamic Commandments.”Dr. Saeid Golkar, “The Ideological-Political Training of Iran’s Basij,” Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies, September 2010, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB44.pdf.

The next level of training consists of courses that include “Jihad and Defense of the Quran,” and “Fluency in Reading the Quran.” Specialized training courses in areas such as advanced psychological warfare and anti-riot training last even longer but are not mandatory. Only after completing this final level of training can Basij members go to mosques, schools, and factories to organize.Dr. Saeid Golkar, “The Ideological-Political Training of Iran’s Basij,” Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies, September 2010, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB44.pdf. Basic Basij members are also trained in practical matters such as weaponry, guard duty, civil defense, and first aid.“Dr. Saeid Golkar, “The Ideological-Political Training of Iran’s Basij,” Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies, September 2010, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB44.pdf.

IPTs are themselves educated by a network of political guides. IPTs are taught subjects like Islamic commandments, the Quran, the history of Islam, sociopolitical knowledge, and the fundamentals of belief.“Dr. Saeid Golkar, “The Ideological-Political Training of Iran’s Basij,” Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies, September 2010, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB44.pdf.

Recruitment

Basij recruitment relies heavily on the cooperation of local and regional mosques. Members are recruited under “clergical [sic] supervision and trusted citizens.” Paid Basij positions are available by application at Basij central offices.Ali Alfoneh, “The Basij Resistance Force | The Iran Primer,” United States Institute of Peace, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force.

The Basij also target Iranian schools for recruitment.“Basij, The Oppressive Arm Of The Iranian Regime,” Radio Farda, January 4, 2018, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/basij-the-oppressive-arm-of-the-iranian-regime-/28954794.html. The Iranian parliament passed a 1996 law authorizing the government to create children’s Basij units. The Basij expanded their recruitment activities in Iranian schools after the disputed 2009 presidential elections, when Basij militants helped to violently suppress protests.Hossein Aryan, “How Schoolchildren Are Brainwashed In Iran,” Radio Farda, May 27, 2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/Commentary_How_Schoolchildren_Are_Brainwashed_In_Iran/2054304.html. In November 2009, the Basij established 6,000 “resistance centers” in the nation’s elementary schools to promote the ideals of the Iranian Revolution.Robert F. Worth, “Iran Expanding Effort to Stifle the Opposition,” New York Times, November 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/24/world/middleeast/24iran.html. By 2010, the so-called Student Basij included 4.6 million members. These students were divided into units based on age: Omidan (“Hopes”) in elementary schools, Pouyandegan (“Seekers”) in middle schools, and Pushgaman (“Standard Bearers”) in high schools.“Basij, The Oppressive Arm Of The Iranian Regime,” Radio Farda, January 4, 2018, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/basij-the-oppressive-arm-of-the-iranian-regime-/28954794.html.

Quds Force

Training

The Quds Force is a special unit of the Revolutionary Guard that oversees weapons and training.Paul Richter, “Top Iranians Direct Iraq Missions,” Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/24/world/fg-usiran24. Basic training can last anywhere from three to nine months and takes place at three main facilities in Iran. The first is the Imam Ali Base near Tehran, which specializes in ground training for foreign fighters. The second is the Wali-e-Assar Base in Shiraz and the third is the “Jerusalem Operation” College in Qom, where trainees study spirituality and ideology. There are other smaller training facilities throughout the country that are used to train armed groups from foreign countries as well.Dore Gold, “Inside the Octopus: Unraveling Iran’s terrorist Quds Force,” Israel Hayom, March 16, 2012, http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=3532. The Quds Force helps operate the Manzariyah training center in Iran near the holy city of Qom. The Manzariyah training center recruits from a pool of foreign students studying at a nearby religious seminary.Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 16, 2007, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070816_cordesman_report.pdf.

Recruitment

The Quds Force sets up recruitment offices near Islamic holy sites to attract a wide variety of devout people from many nationalities throughout the Muslim world, including Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq. The most important recruitment office is in the “Dar al-Tawahid” hotel in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.Dore Gold, “Inside the Octopus: Unraveling Iran's terrorist Quds Force,” Israel Hayom, March 16, 2012, http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=3532. The Quds force helps operate the Manzariyah training center in Iran near the holy city of Qom. The Manzariyah training center recruits from a pool of foreign students studying at a nearby religious seminary.Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 16, 2007, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070816_cordesman_report.pdf. The Quds Force also recruits in Iraq, where they reportedly paid Iraqi Shiites up to $150 per month to go to Iran to train during the anti-U.S. insurgency.“Experts: Iran’s Quds Force Deeply Enmeshed in Iraq,” Fox News, February 16, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/02/16/experts-iran-quds-force-deeply-enmeshed-in-iraq/.

Financing:

IRGC

The Trump administration claimed that it forced the Iranian regime to reduce its military spending by 30 percent since the administration began re-imposing financial sanctions in 2017. Iranian officials have dismissed the effectiveness of renewed sanctions.Andrew England and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, “Iran sustains military spending in face of US sanctions,” Financial Times, February 24, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/d03c20ce-548c-11ea-90ad-25e377c0ee1f. Iran’s defense budget ranges from approximately $10 billion to $15 billion annually. Of that, the IRGC receives approximately two-thirds.“Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies,” Congressional Research Service, last updated April 29, 2020, 15, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44017. Shortly after the death of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani in a U.S. airstrike in January 2020, the Iranian government increased its budget for the Quds Force by more than €200 million over the following two months.Najmeh Bozorgmehr, “Iran considers options for retribution over Soleimani killing,” Financial Times, January 7, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/d74a76c6-308e-11ea-9703-eea0cae3f0de. The funding increase was part of a bill called “Counter-Measures Against U.S.,” which Iran’s parliament approved by a vote of 229-3.“Khamenei Orders Additional 200m Euros To Qods Force In Next Two Months,” Radio Farda, January 7, 2020, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-khamenei-orders-additional-200m-euros-to-qods-in-next-two-months/30364067.html. Iran’s 2021 budget provided the IRGC with an allocation of 403 trillion rials, almost double the 212.79 trillion rials allocated toward Iran’s conventional military. On December 12, 2021, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi submitted a proposed 2022 budget to parliament that more than doubled the IRGC’s government allocation to 930 trillion rials (U.S. $22 billion).Agnes Helou, “Iran more than doubles Revolutionary Guard’s budget in FY22 bill,” Defense News, December 16, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2021/12/16/iran-more-than-doubles-revolutionary-guards-budget-in-fy22-bill/.

Iran has consistently increased its budget allocations to the IRGC in recent years. The IRGC received a reported 24 percent increase in Iran’s proposed 2017-18 fiscal budget, up from $4.5 billion to $7.4 billion. The IRGC’s allocation represented 53 percent of Iran’s defense budget.https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2017/03/31/irans-revolutionary-guard-gets-a-raise/. Iran’s military budget has reportedly experienced a 70 percent increase in funding during President Hassan Rouhani’s tenure,“Budget Bill in Parliament,” Financial Tribune, December 5, 2016, https://financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/54697/budget-bill-in-parliament. growing from $3.3 billion in FY 2013-14 to more than $5 billion after Rouhani assumed the presidency in 2013. Ahead of the FY 2016 budget, however, Rouhani reportedly sought to cut the IRGC’s budget in favor of Iran’s army.Abbas Qaidaari, “Rouhani moves to slash IRGC budget, empower army,” Al-Monitor, May 5, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/iran-military-spending-irgc-budget-reduced-army-increase.html. The Iranian parliament rejected the cut and raised the IRGC’s budgetary allocation.J. Matthew Mcinnis, “Rouhani hopes the new parliament will give him a break,” Newsweek, May 6, 2016, http://www.newsweek.com/rouhani-hopes-parliament-gives-him-break-455673. Rouhani reportedly cut the IRGC’s budget by 17 percent in his proposed 2019-2020 budget submitted in December 2018.Saeed Ghasseminejad and Tzvi Khan, “New Iranian Draft Budget Slashes Military Spending,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, January 8, 2019, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/01/08/new-iranian-draft-budget-slashes-military-spending/. In 2020 alone, the IRGC budget reached $6.96 billion, triple the total budget of Iran’s army and approximately 20 times more than the budget for Iran’s defense department. In December 2020, the proposed budget for 2021-2022 reportedly included a 65 percent increase for the IRGC.Bahram Khodabandeh, “The Revolutionary Guards’ Outsize Share of Iran’s Next Budget,” Iran Wire, December 10, 2020, https://iranwire.com/en/features/8279; Henry Rome, “Iran’s Defense Spending,” U.S. Institute of Peace, June 17, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jun/17/iran%E2%80%99s-defense-spending.

Despite the increases, in June 2021 Iranian President Hasan Rouhani cut the IRGC’s funding for missile production by about 50 percent and also cut funding to the Quds Force, leading IRGC commander Hossein Salami and Quds Force commander Ismail Ghaani to file a complaint with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Salami reportedly asked Khameini to use his own cash budget to transfer the funds needed by the Quds Force to pay the salaries of its fighters and to intervene and force the government to stop its alleged hostile actions.“Iran’s Rouhani cuts Quds Force budget, blocks missiles manufacturing funds,” Middle East Monitor, June 2, 2021, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210602-irans-rouhani-cuts-quds-force-budget-blocks-missiles-manufacturing-funds/; “Major General Hossein Salami: Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” United Against Nuclear Iran, accessed August 25, 2021, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/major-general-hossein-salami-commander-chief-of-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps. At the same time as the alleged budget cuts, reports emerged of Qatari financial support for the IRGC. In late June 2021, outgoing Israeli President Reuven Rivlin delivered intelligence to the White House of the Qatari support. In July 2021, the U.S. State Department opened an investigation into the allegations.Jacob Magid, “Old friends: Rivlin leaves Washington, confident Biden is in Israel’s corner,” Times of Israel, June 29, 2021, https://www.timesofisrael.com/old-friends-rivlin-leaves-washington-confident-biden-is-in-israels-corner/; Benjamin Weinthal and Jothan Spyer, “US investigates Qatar over claims that it finances Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps,” Washington Examiner, July 23, 2021, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/us-investigates-qatar-claims-finances-iran-revolutionary-guard; J.P. Lawrence, “US military shifts Army basing from Qatar to Jordan in move that could provide leverage against Iran,” Stars and Stripes, July 1, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/branches/army/2021-07-01/us-military-closes-qatar-camps-in-move-that-could-play-into-iran-policy-2009140.html.

The IRGC is also Iran’s most powerful economic actor, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, which labeled the National Iranian Oil Company “an agent or affiliate of the Revolutionary Guards.”“Treasury Links Iran Oil to Elite Military,” U.S. Institute of Peace, September 25, 2012, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2012/sep/25/treasury-links-iran-oil-elite-military. According to a 2017 assessment by then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo, IRGC-linked companies control up to 20 percent of Iran’s economy.Michael R. Gordon, Warren P. Strobel, and Nancy A. Youssef, “U.S. to Designate Iranian Guard Corps a Foreign Terror Group,” Wall Street Journal, April 5, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-designate-iranian-guard-corps-a-foreign-terrorist-organization-11554499401. In July 2018, the city council of Tehran announced that the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, which manages the IRGC’s investments, had embezzled more than $1 billion from the city of Tehran.“Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” U.S. Department of State, April 8, 2019, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2019/04/290963.htm.

Within the IRGC, the Quds Force exerts control over strategic industries, commercial services, and black-market enterprises.Greg Bruno, Jayshree Bajoria, and Jonathan Masters, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 14, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-revolutionary-guards/p14324. According to a 2007 Los Angeles Times report, the IRGC has ties to over 100 companies, controlling over $12 billion.Kim Murphy, “Iran’s $12-Billion Enforcers,” Los Angeles Times, August 26, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/26/world/fg-guards26. These funds are used to exert influence in Iran and Iranian proxies. According to Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations, the IRGC is “heavily involved in everything from pharmaceuticals to telecommunications and pipelines – even the new Imam Khomeini Airport and a great deal of smuggling. Many of the front companies engaged in procuring nuclear technology are owned and run by the Revolutionary Guards. They're developing along the lines of the Chinese military, which is involved in many business enterprises. It's a huge business conglomeration.”Robin Wright, “Iranian Unit to Be Labeled ‘Terrorist,’” Washington Post, August 15, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/14/AR2007081401662.html.

After the 2015 nuclear agreement—which opened Iran’s economy to the international market, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s government attempted to restrict the IRGC’s economic power in Iran, open Iran’s economy internationally, and attract foreign investors by canceling government contracts with IRGC subsidiaries. An unidentified IRGC source told Reuters in November 2016 that any U.S. attempt to restrict the Iranian economy from global markets would result in the IRGC regaining its economic control of Iran.Parisa Hafezi, “Iran’s Guards using Trump victory to claw back power,” Reuters, November 21, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-politics-guards-idUSKBN13G1NB. In March 2016, Khamenei called for the IRGC to play a larger role in creating a “resistance economy” in Iran, independent of the international community.Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “Revolutionary Guards look to play bigger role in Iran's economy,” Reuters, March 22, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-economy-irgc-idUSKCN0WO137.

In August 2015, Reuters reported that the IRGC stood to benefit from the lifting of economic sanctions against Iran as part of the P5+1 nuclear deal. One beneficiary Reuters highlighted is IRGC conglomerate KAA, which reportedly controls at least 812 affiliated companies worth billions of dollars.Babak Deghghanpisheh and Yeganeh Torbati, “Firms linked to Revolutionary Guards to win sanctions relief under Iran deal,” Reuters, August 9, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/09/us-iran-nuclear-sanctions-idUSKCN0QE08320150809;
“Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),” United Against Nuclear Iran, accessed February 14, 2017, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/report/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc. KAA subsidiary companies have been sanctioned by the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations as “proliferators of weapons of mass destruction,” according to the U.S. government.Babak Deghghanpisheh and Yeganeh Torbati, “Firms linked to Revolutionary Guards to win sanctions relief under Iran deal,” Reuters, August 9, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/09/us-iran-nuclear-sanctions-idUSKCN0QE08320150809. The IRGC reportedly controlled one-third of Iran’s economy as of 2010.Mark Gregory, “Expanding business empire of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards,” BBC News, July 26, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10743580. As of November 2016, the group viewed the possibility of renewed sanctions against Iran and the threat posed by ISIS as pathways to limiting foreign investment in Iran and reestablishing IRGC control of the economy.Parisa Hafezi, “Iran’s Guards using Trump victory to claw back power,” Reuters, November 21, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-politics-guards-idUSKBN13G1NB.

In addition to its roles in Iran’s other economic sectors, the IRGC also profits from Iran’s oil industry. On October 26, 2020, the U.S. government sanctioned the Iranian Ministry of Petroleum, the National Iranian Oil Company, and the National Iranian Tanker Company for their financial support to the Quds Force. U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin accused Iran of using “the petroleum sector to fund the destabilizing activities of the IRGC-QF.”“Treasury Sanctions Key Actors in Iran’s Oil Sector for Supporting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 26, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1165.

In October 2017, the U.S. government designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization and levied financial sanctions against it for the IRGC’s support of the Quds Force, as well as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Taliban.“Non-proliferation Designations; Iran Designations; Counter Terrorism Designation Update,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 13, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20171013.aspx; “Treasury Designates the IRGC under Terrorism Authority and Targets IRGC and Military Supporters under Counter-Proliferation Authority,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 13, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0177.aspx. In March 2018, members of the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee began discussing additional sanctions on entities in which the IRGC has a 50-percent-or-less ownership stake in order to punish IRGC front companies.“Royce, Engel Introduce Bill Targeting Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps,” U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, March 1, 2018, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/royce-engel-introduce-bill-targeting-irans-revolutionary-guards-corps/. The U.S. government designated the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization in April 2019, opening the possibility of levying additional sanctions on IRGC-related businesses.“Iran will retaliate in kind if U.S. designates Guards as terrorists: MPs,” Reuters, April 7, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-guards/iran-will-retaliate-in-kind-if-u-s-designates-guards-as-terrorists-mps-idUSKCN1RJ07U; “Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” U.S. Department of State, April 8, 2019, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2019/04/290963.htm; “The Latest: Iran responds to US, labels CENTCOM terrorist.” Associated Press, April 8, 2019, https://www.apnews.com/f635668cc3d6478984ddcb39dd7c78c8. According to U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin, “Iran employs a web of front companies to fund terrorist groups across the region, siphoning resources away from the Iranian people and prioritizing terrorist proxies over the basic needs of its people.”“Treasury Designates Vast Network of IRGC-QF Officials and Front Companies in Iraq, Iran,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 26, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm957.

The United States has since sanction-designated multiple Iranian businesses and their leaders for ties to the IRGC. In October 2019, the U.S.-led Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC) jointly designated 25 targets accused of supporting the IRGC and Hezbollah. Included in the sanctions were 21 businesses accused of providing financial support to the IRGC’s Basij militia. The TFTC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States.“Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Jointly Designates Network of Corporations, Banks, and Individuals Supporting IRGC and Hizballah,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 30, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm813. In March 2020, the U.S. government sanctioned 20 companies based in Iran and Iraq linked to the IRGC.“Treasury Designates Vast Network of IRGC-QF Officials and Front Companies in Iraq, Iran,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 26, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm957. In May 2020, the Treasury Department sanctioned Iranian-Iraqi national Amir Dianat and his Taif Mining Services LLC company for involvement in the shipment of missiles on behalf of the IRGC-Quds Force and smuggling “lethal aid” from Iran to Yemen.“Treasury Designates IRGC-Qods Force Front Company and Owner,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, May 1, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm995.

Iran also utilizes multiple front companies in and around the Middle East to facilitate the flow of money to the IRGC, which then provides financing to Iran’s terror proxies. In 2018, for example, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on two individuals—Muhammad Qasim al-Bazzal and Ali Qasir—accused of heading international front companies that finance transactions between Hezbollah and the IRGC.“Treasury Designates Illicit Russia-Iran Oil Network Supporting the Assad Regime, Hizballah, and HAMAS,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 20, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm553. Bazzal is co-founder of the Syria-based Talaqi Group and a key financier for Hezbollah and the IRGC-Quds Force. Qasir is the managing director of the Talaqi Group. Since 2018, Bazzal has used the Talaqi Group and his other companies to facilitate illicit oil shipments for the Quds Force.“Rewards for Justice – Up to $10 Million Reward Offer for Information on Hizballah’s Financial Networks: Muhammad Qasir, Muhammad Qasim al-Bazzal, and Ali Qasir,” U.S. Department of State, October 23, 2020, https://www.state.gov/rewards-for-justice-up-to-10-million-reward-offer-for-information-on-hizballahs-financial-networks-muhammad-qasir-muhammad-qasim-al-bazzal-and-ali-qasir/.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) accuses the IRGC of using the Central Bank of Syria to coordinate financial transfers with Hezbollah. According to OFAC, Iran has created an international network working with Russian companies to provide millions of barrels of oil to the Syrian government. Syria then facilitates the movement of hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars to the IRGC, which distributes the money to Hezbollah and Hamas. U.S.-designated Hezbollah official Muhammad Qasir heads the Hezbollah unit responsible for facilitating the transfer of weapons, technology, and other support from Syria to Lebanon. According to the U.S. State Department, Qasir is a “critical link” between Iran and Hezbollah.“Rewards for Justice – Up to $10 Million Reward Offer for Information on Hizballah’s Financial Networks: Muhammad Qasir, Muhammad Qasim al-Bazzal, and Ali Qasir,” U.S. Department of State, October 23, 2020, https://www.state.gov/rewards-for-justice-up-to-10-million-reward-offer-for-information-on-hizballahs-financial-networks-muhammad-qasir-muhammad-qasim-al-bazzal-and-ali-qasir/.

On August 13, 2021, OFAC imposed sanctions on Omani national Mahmood Rashid Amur Al Habsi and a network of his businesses. According to OFAC, Al Habsi’s Oman-based company, Nimr International L.L.C., facilitated the sale and shipment of Iranian oil in support of the Quds Force. OFAC also designated Oman-based Orbit Petrochemicals Trading LLC, which it accused Al Habsi of using to facilitate Iranian oil deals that obscured the Quds Force’s involvement. OFAC also designated Liberian-registered Bravery Maritime Corporation and Romania-based Nimr International S.R.L. for being owned, controlled, or directed by Al Habsi.“Treasury Targets Oil Broker Network Supporting Qods Force,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 13, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0320.

The Iranian government has also sought to directly expand the IRGC’s control over Iran’s economy. In January 2022, Iran’s energy ministry announced a 300-billion-rial contract with the IRGC’s Imam Hasan Headquarters for water projects in rural areas.Maryam Sinaee, “Iran Revolutionary Guards Enter The Rice Business,” Iran International, January 29, 2022, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202201293264. Also, that month, the Iranian government reportedly awarded a $3 billion rice farming project to the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbia engineering firm, which would make Iran independent of the rice import market.Maryam Sinaee, “Iran Revolutionary Guards Enter The Rice Business,” Iran International, January 29, 2022, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202201293264. Khatam al-Anbia denied the report, but it remains one of Iran’s largest contractors in industrial and development projects. In February 2022, the Iranian parliament’s Budget Reconciliation Committee announced a deal with Khatam al-Anbia to complete unfinished prayer houses in exchange for more than $477 million in crude oil.“Another Day, Another Financial Boost for the Revolutionary Guards,” Iran Wire, February 10, 2022, https://iranwire.com/en/features/11289.

Basij

The Basij received a budget of $310.85 million in the 2015 fiscal year.“Iran decreases IRGC budget for next year,” AzerNews, January 18, 2016, http://www.azernews.az/region/91769.html. In the 2009-2010 budget, the Basij received $430 million from the government, but also reportedly earned large sums of cash through its control of non-profit foundations created by the Basij and IRGC in the 1980s and 1990s. The Basij is also reportedly a major investor in the Tehran stock exchange.Ali Alfoneh, “The Basij Resistance Force | The Iran Primer,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed February 27, 2015, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force.

Also Known As:

  • Islamic Revolutionary Guards
  • Pasdaran (“Guards”)
  • Revolutionary Guards
  • Sepah (“Corps”)
  • Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami (“Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps”)

  • Type of Organization:
    Military, terrorist, transnational, violent
  • Ideologies and Affiliations:
    Islamist, Khomeinist, Shiite, state actor
  • Place of Origin:
    Iran
  • Year of Origin:
    1979
  • Founder(s):

    Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

  • Places of Operation:

    Afghanistan, Europe, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, South America, Syria

Ali Khamenei

Supreme Leader of Iran, Former President of Iran, Shiite cleric

Mohammad Ali Jafari

Director, Hazrat-e Baqiatollah Social and Cultural Base; former commander of the IRGC

Abdollah Haji Sadeghi

Representative of the Guardian Jurist to the IRGC

Gholamreza Soleimani

Commander of the Basij Resistance Force

Mohammad Kazemi

Director of the IRGC Intelligence Organization

IRGC and IRGC-Quds Force

The Council on Foreign Relations describe the IRGC and Quds Force as Iran’s “primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad.”Greg Bruno, “State Sponsors: Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated October 13, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362. According to a 2010 Pentagon report, the Quds Force “maintains operational capabilities around the world,” and “it is well established in the Middle East and North Africa and recent years have witnessed an increased presence in Latin America, particularly Venezuela.”Bill Gertz, “Iran Boosts Qods Shock Troops in Venezuela,” Washington Times, April 21, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/21/iran-boosts-qods-shock-troops-in-venezuela/. Further, the report concluded that if “U.S. involvement in conflict in these regions deepens, contact with the IRGC-QF, directly or through extremist groups it supports, will be more frequent and consequential.”Bill Gertz, “Iran Boosts Qods Shock Troops in Venezuela,” Washington Times, April 21, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/21/iran-boosts-qods-shock-troops-in-venezuela/. Illustrating this point, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 2012 reportedly ordered the Quds Force to step up attacks against Western targets in retaliation for U.S.-backing of Syrian rebels in that country’s civil war.Con Coughlin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Orders Fresh Terror Attacks on West,” Telegraph (London), August 22, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9490878/Irans-supreme-leader-orders-fresh-terror-attacks-on-West.html.

According to a 2013 bill in the U.S. House of Representatives to label the Quds Force a terrorist organization, the Quds Force “stations operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and religious and cultural institutions to foster relationships, often building on existing socio-economic ties with the well-established Shia Diaspora, and recent years have witnessed an increased presence in Latin America.”“Text of H.R. 854: Qods Force Terrorist Designation Act (Introduced Version),” GovTrack.us, February 27, 2013, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr854/text.

The IRGC and IRGC-QF have been accused of the following acts in individual countries:

Afghanistan:

  • The Pentagon has accused the Iranian regime of providing “ongoing” support to insurgents – and insurgent leaders Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ismail Khan in particular – through Quds forces, which are working with non-governmental organizations and political opposition.Bill Gertz, “Iran Boosts Qods Shock Troops in Venezuela,” Washington Times, April 21, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/21/iran-boosts-qods-shock-troops-in-venezuela/. “Arms caches have been recently uncovered [in Afghanistan] with large amounts of Iranian-manufactured weapons, to include 107 millimeter rockets, which we assess IRGC-QF delivered to Afghan militants,” according to a 2010 Pentagon report.Bill Gertz, “Iran Boosts Qods Shock Troops in Venezuela,” Washington Times, April 21, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/21/iran-boosts-qods-shock-troops-in-venezuela/.
  • The U.S. State Department suspects Iran, through the IRGC-QF, of providing training and weapons—including “small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, and plastic explosives—to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.Greg Bruno, “State Sponsors: Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated October 13, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362.

Argentina:

Austria:

  • On July 13, 1989, Iranian Kurdish dissident Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was shot to death along with Fadil Rasoul and Abdullah Ghaderi after being lured to a supposed negotiation with Iranian government officials. The three Iranians who committed the murders were arrested by Austrian authorities, but later released. Austrian police confirmed that at least one of the suspected killers was bearing an Iranian diplomatic passport.“Iranian Wounded in Vienna Killings,” Reuters, July 17, 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-07-17/news/mn-2921_1_iranian-kurdish. However, the suspected killers were allowed to leave Austria and return to Iran “after the Austrian government came under massive pressure from the Iranian government.”“Iranian President Allegedly Involved in Vienna Murders,” Austrian Times, June 18, 2009, http://www.austriantimes.at/index.php?id=14092. Iran’s Minister of Information and Security, Ali Fallahian, later boasted of the assassinations in a televised interview, saying: “we were able to deal vital blows to the cadres” of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Ghassemlou’s group.“Iran: Mykonos Trial Provides Further Evidence of Iranian Policy of Unlawful State Killings,” Amnesty International, April 10, 1997, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/015/1997/en/0fb294cb-ea83-11dd-b05d-65164b228191/mde130151997en.html.

Azerbaijan:

Bahrain:

  • The government of Bahrain has accused the Quds Force of providing explosives training to Bahraini militants opposed to the government. On December 29, 2013, the Bahraini Coast Guard intercepted a speedboat carrying weaponry and explosives meant for Shiite militants in Bahrain, particularly the 14 February Youth Coalition.“Country Reports on Terrorism 2013,” U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm. Following the incident, authorities discovered weapons caches in Bahrain, dismantled a car bomb, and arrested 15 Bahraini nationals.“Country Reports on Terrorism 2013,” U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm.

Cyprus

Georgia

  • In November 2022, Israeli media reported security officials in Georgia had foiled a recent IRGC-Quds Force attempt to kill Itzik Moshe, a prominent Georgian-Israeli living in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. According to the report, Quds Force operations in several countries planned the attack, while a Pakistani team affiliated with al-Qaeda flew to Tbilisi to prepare for the attack and gather intelligence.Lazar Berman, “Assassination plot by Iran’s IRGC targeted prominent Israeli living in Georgia,” Times of Israel, November 15, 2022, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/assassination-plot-by-irans-irgc-targeted-prominent-israeli-living-in-georgia/.

Germany:

  • Four Iranian Kurdish dissidents are assassinated at Mykonos, a Greek restaurant in Berlin. In 1997, a German court issued an international arrest warrant for Iranian Intelligence Minister Hojjat al-Islam Ali Fallahian, after determining that he had ordered the assassination with the knowledge of Supreme Leader Ali Khameini.Roya Hakakian, “Looking Back at the Mykonos Trial: The End of the Dispensable Iranian,” Spiegel Online, October 4, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/looking-back-at-the-mykonos-trial-the-end-of-the-dispensable-iranian-a-476369.html. A report by Amnesty International noted that the Mykonos killings constituted part of a broader pattern of murder of Iranian political dissidents, with reports of state-directed assassinations both inside Iran and in neighboring Turkey.“Iran: Mykonos Trial Provides Further Evidence of Iranian Policy of Unlawful State Killings,” Amnesty International, April 10, 1997, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/015/1997/en/0fb294cb-ea83-11dd-b05d-65164b228191/mde130151997en.html.
  • On November 30, 2022, German state security sources reportedly accused the IRGC of contracting state-sponsored terrorism against German synagogues in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia and spying on the president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany. The attacks included a November 18 shooting attack on the Old Synagogue in Essen and a failed arson attack on a synagogue in Bochum. German police arrested a 35-year-old German-Iranian in Dortmund for the attempted arson in Bochum and allegedly attempting to recruit somebody to carry out an arson attack on a synagogue in Dortmund. According to media reports, the IRGC contracted with Tehran-based Ramin Yektaparast—a German-Iranian fugitive and the founder of the Hells Angels chapter in the city of Mönchengladbach, Germany—to orchestrate the attacks. Yektaparast reportedly fled Germany in 2021 to escape trial for the 2014 murder and dismemberment of a fellow Hells Angel member accused of being an informant. The Yektaparast-led cell was allegedly responsible for the November attacks, as well as a security threat targeting the president of the Central Council of German Jews. Yektaparast fled to Iran in 2021. He has since posted to Instagram about how there is no legal way for German authorities to arrest him since there is no extradition treaty between the two countries. In 2023, German authorities continued to investigate IRGC and Iranian influence on antisemitic attacks in Germany.Benjamin Weinthal, “Iran’s IRGC responsible for antisemitic attacks in Germany – report,” Jerusalem Post, December 1, 2022, https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/article-723869; Tim Hume, “Iran Hired Hells Angel Leader to Organise Attacks on German Synagogues: Report,” Vice, December 2, 2022, https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgp4w8/iran-hells-angel-germany-synagogues; Loveday Morris and Souad Mekhennet, “Hells Angels, a synagogue shooting and Iran’s shady hand in Germany,” Washington Post, March 6, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/06/iran-revolutionary-guard-attacks-germany/; Von Jonas Mueller-Töwe, “Irans Staatsterror erreicht Deutschland,” t-online, June 20, 2023, https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/deutschland/innenpolitik/id_100194366/irans-staatsterror-in-deutschland-anschlaege-auf-juedische-einrichtungen-ermittlungen.html.

India:

Iran:

  • The IRGC has been accused of numerous violent acts against the Iranian population, particularly during the 2009 protests against Ahmadinejad’s reelection. The Basij paramilitary organization is accused of brutally suppressing protests after the June 2009 election.“IRGC’s Basij Paramilitary Trains Special Battalions for Crackdown on Potential Protests,” International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, February 24, 2014, http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/02/basij-battalions/.
  • According to Human Rights Watch, hundreds of protesters were arrested after the June 12, 2009, elections and the Basij militia attacked student dormitories, beating the students and ransacking their rooms. Human Rights Watch also reported members of the Basij militia appearing in large groups at mass demonstrations and attacking protesters. There were reports of Basij members armed with clubs and chains beating up anyone suspected of participating in the protests against the government.“Iran: Halt the Crackdown,” Human Rights Watch, June 19, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/19/iran-halt-crackdown.
  • In September 2022, the IRGC and the Basij joined in violently suppressing protests that erupted after the September 16 death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish woman who died in custody after being detained by Tehran’s morality police, the Guidance Patrol, earlier in the month. The Guidance Patrol sent Amini to a detention center to undergo re-education when they claimed she was not wearing a hijab properly. She died three days later. In response, protests erupted across the country against Iran’s theocratic rule. On September 22, the IRGC issued a statement of support for Iranian police in combating the protests and accused protesters of sedition. On September 23, protesters set fire to an IRGC military base in northern Iran. The IRGC accused the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan in Iraq of encouraging protests within Iran. According to media sources, the opposition groups had reportedly deployed armed forces and smuggled weapons into border towns to “stoke unrest” in Iran due to ongoing protests. At least 185 protesters were killed since the protests began after confrontations with Iranian security forces, but information has been limited due to disrupted and limited Internet access throughout the country. The IRGC and Basij aided in suppressing the protests, leading to violent clashes with protesters. IRGC commanders reportedly sent their families to safe houses in Tehran. The IRGC claimed it identified the individuals who sparked the protests and would mete out punishment. By December 1, Iranian security forces had reportedly killed an estimated 450 people since the protests began. On December 3, Iran’s Attorney General Mohammad Javad Montazeri announced the disbandment of the morality police. Nonetheless, the IRGC continued to promise harsh responses to protesters. After the announcement, journalists reported from Iran that the Basij were still actively patrolling at night in Tehran. Arsalan Shahla, “Iran Launches Artillery Against Militants in Northern Iraq,” September 24, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-24/iran-launches-artillery-against-militants-in-northern-iraq?leadSource=uverify%20wall; “Exclusive: IRGC Commanders’ Families Placed in Tehran ‘Safe House,” Iran Wire, September 26, 2022, https://iranwire.com/en/iran/107958-exclusive-irgc-commanders-families-placed-in-tehran-safe-house/; “IRGC will not hesitate to target origin of any anti-Iran operation wherever it may be: General,” Press TV, September 27, 2022, https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2022/09/27/689915/IRGC-will-not-hesitate-target-origin-any-anti-Iran-operation-General; Caitlin McFall, “The Guardian Patrol sent Amini to a detention center to undergo re-education when they claimed she was not wearing a hijab properly. She died three days later.,” Fox News, September 24, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/world/protestors-clash-revolutionary-guard-northern-iran-torch-irgc-base-reports; “Iran’s Guards Break Their Silence, Warn Protesters,” Iran International, September 22, 2022, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202209229946; “Lebanon’s Hezbollah Helping Iran In Its Pro-Government Propaganda,” Iran International, October 9, 2022, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202210091141; Vivian Yee and Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran Has Abolished Morality Police, an Official Suggests, After Months of Protests,” New York Times, last updated December 5, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/04/world/middleeast/iran-morality-police.html; Patrick Wintour and Maryam Foumani, “Iran: mass strike starts amid mixed messages around abolishment of morality police,” Guardian (London), December 5, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/05/iran-strike-abolishment-morality-police; “IRGC Commander Praises Khamenei For Not Needing A Nuclear Deal,” Iran International, December 1, 2022, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202212010459.
    • On December 5, after Iran’s judiciary handed out four death sentences for rioters allegedly affiliated with Israel’s Mossad spy agency, the IRGC released a statement praising the sentences and declaring no mercy will be shown to rioters, thugs, or terrorists serving Iran’s enemies.“IRGC: No mercy will be shown to rioters, thugs, terrorists serving Iran's enemies,” Press TV, December 5, 2022, https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2022/12/05/693944/Iran-IRGC-statement-riots-mercy-thugs-judiciary-.

Iraq:

Israel:

Lebanon:

Mexico:

Saudi Arabia:

  • A truck bomb exploded on June 25, 1996, at a dormitory complex at Saudi Arabia’s Khobar Towers, housing U.S. Air Force pilots and staff, killing 19 Americans and wounding 372 other people.“Attorney General Statement,” U.S. Department of Justice, June 21, 2001, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/06/khobar.html. A U.S. federal grand jury in 2001 indicted the leader of Saudi Arabia Hezbollah and 13 other members for the 1996 Khobar Towers attack, and charged “elements of the Iranian government inspired, supported, and supervised members of the Saudi Hizballah. In particular, the indictment alleged that the charged defendants reported their surveillance activities to Iranian officials and were supported and directed in those activities by Iranian officials. This indictment did not name as defendants individual members of the Iranian government.”“Attorney General Statement,” U.S. Department of Justice, June 21, 2001, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/06/khobar.html.
  • Six Hezbollah members captured after the attacks implicated Iranian officials. After “overwhelming” evidence presented by experts on Hezbollah, U.S. Federal Judge Royce C. Lamberth ruled in December 2006 that Iran was responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing, and ordered the Iranian government to pay $254 million to the families of 17 Americans victims.Carol D. Leonnig, “Iran Held Liable In Khobar Attack,” Washington Post, December 23, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/22/AR2006122200455.html. Lamberth pointed to evidence that the Iranian military worked with Saudi Hezbollah members to carry out the attack, and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security provided money, plans, and maps to help carry out the bombing.Carol D. Leonnig, “Iran Held Liable In Khobar Attack,” Washington Post, December 23, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/22/AR2006122200455.html.

Syria:

Syria is Iran’s main supply route to Hezbollah in Lebanon“Country Reports on Terrorism 2013,” U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm. and thus a strategic asset. As such, the Iranian government has an interest in keeping besieged Syrian President Bashar Assad in power.

  • Before the Syrian civil war, between 2,000 and 3,000 IRGC officers were stationed in Syria, helping to train local troops and managing supply routes of arms and money to neighboring Lebanon.Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, “Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudis’ U.S. Envoy,” New York Times, October 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-envoy.html.
  • By Iran’s own admission, members of the Quds Force are acting in an advisory capacity to Syrian government forces in that country’s civil war, and Iran has committed itself to providing arms, financing, and training to Iraqi Shiite fighters in the war. A retired senior IRGC commander claims there are at least 60 to 70 Quds Force commanders in Syria at any given time.Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, “Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudis’ U.S. Envoy,” New York Times, October 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-envoy.html.
  • In April 2011, the United States and the European Union accused the Quds Force of providing equipment and support to help the Syrian regime suppress revolts.Greg Bruno, “State Sponsors: Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated October 13, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362.
  • In 2013, two senior Quds Force commanders were killed in fighting in Syria. According to Iranian media, Commander Mohammad Jamalizadeh Paghaleh, killed in November 2013 in Aleppo, was volunteering to defend Sayyida Zainab mosque in Damascus, more than 200 miles away from Aleppo.“Country Reports on Terrorism 2013,” U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm.

Turkey:

  • In February 1996, two Iranians thought to be members of the opposition National Council of Resistance of Iran were assassinated in Turkey. An Iranian citizen, Reza Massoumi, was convicted of the killings. At his trial, he stated that he had acted on orders from the Iranian government.“Document - Iran: ‘Mykonos’ Trial Provides Further Evidence of Iranian Policy of Unlawful State Killings,” Amnesty International, April 10, 1997, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/015/1997/en/0fb294cb-ea83-11dd-b05d-65164b228191/mde130151997en.html.
  • In the aftermath of the 2009 election crisis in Iran, Iranian refugees in Turkey began to report facing monitoring and harassment from Iranian government agents inside Turkey.Deborah Amos, “Iranian Agents Track Dissidents Who Fled To Turkey,” National Public Radio, January 4, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122207587.

United States:

  • According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Mansour Arbabsiar, a naturalized U.S. citizen holding both Iranian and U.S. passports, acted on behalf of the Quds Force to plan a failed assassination attempt on the Saudi ambassador to the United States in Washington, D.C., in 2011.“Treasury Sanctions Five Individual Tied to Iranian Ploy to Assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 11, 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1320.aspx. The Treasury named Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani; senior Quds Force officer Hamed Abdollahi, who coordinated aspects of the plot and oversaw the other Quds Force officials directly responsible for coordinating and planning this operation; Abdul Reza Shahlai, a Quds Force official who coordinated the operation; and Ali Gholam Shakuri, a Quds Force official who met with Arbabsiar to discuss the assassination and other planned attacks.“Treasury Sanctions Five Individual Tied to Iranian Ploy to Assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 11, 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1320.aspx.
  • Abdul Reza Shahlai, a Quds Force official who coordinated the failed assassination attempt on the Saudi ambassador, had previously been linked to the killing of U.S. forces in Iraq, according to Col. Timothy J. Geraghty, USMC (retired).“Marine Commander Links 1983 Bomb and 2011 Plot,” United States Institute of Peace, October 26, 2011, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/oct/26/marine-commander-links-1983-bomb-and-2011-plot.
  • A 2012 New York Police Department intelligence report linked the IRGC or its proxies to nine foiled international plots against Jewish or Israeli targets.Mark Hosenball, “Exclusive: New York Police Link Nine 2012 Plots to Iran, Proxies,” Reuters, July 20, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/20/us-iran-hezbollah-plots-idUSBRE86J0SW20120720.
  • On August 10, 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice charged IRGC member Shahram Poursafi with attempting to assassinate Ambassador John Bolton, the former national security adviser under President Donald Trump. According to the indictment, Poursafi sought to arrange for Bolton’s assassination in October 2021 in retaliation for the January 2020 death of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. The Justice Department alleges Poursafi attempted to pay individuals in the United States $300,000 to carry out the murder in Washington, D.C., or Maryland. Poursafi is charged with use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire and with providing and attempting to provide material support to a transnational murder plot. He remains at large.“Member of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Charged with Plot to Murder the Former National Security Advisor,” U.S. Department of Justice, August 10, 2022, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/member-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc-charged-plot-murder-former-national.
  • On March 23, 2023, a suspected IRGC drone killed a U.S. contractor and wounded seven other Americans at a U.S. base in northeast Syria. According to U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, the American intelligence community determined the drone originated in Iran. In response, U.S. fighters struck multiple targets in Syria.Josh Boak, Bassem Mroue, and Jon Gambrell, “Biden: US will ‘forcefully’ protect personnel in Syria,” Associated Press, March 24, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/us-military-syria-iran-db9ac72843a0a71c995d6ea04392cdbf.

Yemen

The Basij:

While it was involved in the Iran-Iraq War, the Basij was primarily a domestic organization within Iran, where it acted as an extra-judicial police force.

  • During the early years of the revolution, before the new regime could establish an effective police force, the Basij was responsible for maintaining security, removing anti-revolutionary components and Shah loyalists from the system. To do this, it created an information network nicknamed “the 36 million information network.”Frederic Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica, Arlington, and Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2009), 30.
  • In July 1980, loyalists to the Shah attempted a coup, called the Nojeh coup attempt, but a Basij spy had infiltrated the group and reported it to the ayatollah’s regime.Frederic Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica, Arlington, and Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2009), 30.
  • The Basij was kept out of the Iran-Iraq War during its first year, but its later participation is credited with transforming Iran’s position from defensive to offensive.Frederic Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica, Arlington, and Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2009), 30.
  • The Basij paramilitary organization is accused of brutally suppressing protests after the contested June 2009 election.“IRGC’s Basij Paramilitary Trains Special Battalions for Crackdown on Potential Protests,” International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, February 24, 2014, http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/02/basij-battalions/. According to Human Rights Watch, hundreds of protesters were arrested after the June 12 elections and the Basij militia attacked student dormitories, beating students and ransacking their rooms.“Iran: Halt the Crackdown,” Human Rights Watch, June 19, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/19/iran-halt-crackdown. Human Rights Watch also reported members of the Basij militia appearing in large groups at mass demonstrations and attacking protesters.“Iran: Halt the Crackdown,” Human Rights Watch, June 19, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/19/iran-halt-crackdown. There were reports of Basij members armed with clubs and chains beating up anyone suspected of participating in the protests against the government.“Iran: Halt the Crackdown,” Human Rights Watch, June 19, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/19/iran-halt-crackdown. Hezbollah and Hamas were also suspected of working with the Basij to quash the protests.Paul L. Williams, “Hamas and Hezbollah Unite to Crush Iranian Dissidents,” Canada Free Press, June 18, 2009, http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/12109. On December 27, 2009, on the Shiite holy day of Ashura, during which violence of any kind is forbidden, Basij forces opened fire on the largest protest rally since the contested June presidential election, resulting in the death of 15 and arrest of hundreds. Jim Sciutto, “Protester: ‘Killing Muslims on Ashura Is Like Crucifying Christians on Christmas,’” ABC News, December 28, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/iranian-government-arrests-hundreds-tensions-mount/story?id=9436148.

Naval Activities:

The IRGC naval branch has seized foreign oil tankers and harassed ships in or near Iranian waters.

  • Designations
  • Associations
  • Media Coverage
  • Rhetoric

Designations by the U.S. Government:

    • October 25, 2007: The Department of the Treasury designates Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224.“Treasury Sanctions Five Individuals Tied to Iranian Plot to Assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 11, 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1320.aspx; “Treasury and State Department Iran Designations Identifier Information Pursuant to E.O. 13224 (Terrorism) and E.O. 13382 (WMD),” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 25, 2007, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp644report.pdf.
    • October 25, 2007: The Department of the Treasury designates Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and their Supporters under Executive Order 13382.“Nonproliferation,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, accessed February 25, 2015, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/documents/wmd.pdf; “Treasury and State Department Iran Designations Identifier Information Pursuant to E.O. 13224 (Terrorism) and E.O. 13382 (WMD),” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 25, 2007, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp644report.pdf; “Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State, October 25, 2007, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94193.htm.
    • October 25, 2007: The Department of the Treasury designates Hosein Salimi, commander of IRGC air force; Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie, deputy commander of the IRGC; Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian, in 2007 the most recent former chief of the IRGC Joint Staff; Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi, in 2007 the most recent former commander of Basij militia; Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, as Individual associated with IRGC, designated under Executive Order 13382.“Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State, October 25, 2007, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94193.htm.
    • September 29, 2010: The Department of the Treasury designates Mohammad Ali Jafari, then commander of the IRGC forces; Sadeq Mahsouli, then Minister of Welfare and Social Security; Qolam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejel, then Prosecutor General of Iran; Saeed Mortazavi, former Tehran Prosecutor-General; Heydar Moslehi, then Minister of Intelligence; Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, then Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces; Ahmad-Reza Radan, then Deputy Chief of Iran’s National Police; Hossein Taeb, then Deputy IRGC Commander of Intelligence, as Human rights abusers under executive order 13553.“Fact Sheet: New Executive Order Targeting Iranian Officials Responsible for or Complicit in Serious Human Rights Abuses,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 29, 2010, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg877.aspx.
    • February 2011: The Department of the Treasury designates Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi, Tehran Prosecutor General; Mohammed Reza Naqdi, commander of IRGC’s Basij Forces, as Human rights abusers under executive order 13553.“Treasury Designates Tehran Prosecutor General, Basij Commander for Human Rights Abuses in Iran,” U.S. Department of Treasury, February 23, 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1076.aspx; “Fact Sheet: New Executive order Targeting Iranian Officials Responsible For Or Complicit In Serious Human Rights Abuses,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 29, 2010, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg877.aspx.
    • March 27, 2012: The Department of the Treasury designates Esmail Ghani as a Specially Designated National.“Anti-Terrorism Designations,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 27, 2012, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20120327.aspx.
    • October 13, 2017: The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control labels the IRGC a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for its activities “in support of the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) … for providing support to a number of terrorist groups, including Hizballah and Hamas, as well as to the Taliban.”“Non-proliferation Designations; Iran Designations; Counter Terrorism Designation Update,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 13, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20171013.aspx; “Treasury Designates the IRGC under Terrorism Authority and Targets IRGC and Military Supporters under Counter-Proliferation Authority,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 13, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0177.aspx.
    • April 15, 2019: The U.S. Department of State designates the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.“Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” U.S. Department of State, April 8, 2019, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2019/04/290963.htm; “Statement from the President on the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” White House, April 8, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-designation-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-foreign-terrorist-organization/.
    • June 24, 2019: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designates IRGC Navy commander Ali Reza Tangsiri as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224 for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC.“Issuance of Executive Order of June 24, 2019, ‘Imposing Sanctions with Respect to Iran;’ Iran-related Designations; Counter Terrorism Designations,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 24, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20190624.
    • January 10, 2020: The U.S. Department of the Treasury designates IRGC deputy coordinator Mohammad Reza Naqdi, IRGC Admiral Ali Shamkhani, Basij commander Gholamreza Soleimani, and IRGC Brigadier General Ali Abdollahi for their role in advancing Iran’s destabilizing objectives.“Treasury Targets Iran’s Billion Dollar Metals Industry and Senior Regime Officials,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 10, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm870.
    • March 26, 2020: The U.S. Department of the Treasury designates Sayyed Yaser Musavir as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.“Treasury Designates Vast Network of IRGC-QF Officials and Front Companies in Iraq, Iran,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 26, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm957/.
    • March 26, 2020: The U.S. Department of the Treasury designates Mehdi Ghasemzadeh as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.“Treasury Designates Vast Network of IRGC-QF Officials and Front Companies in Iraq, Iran,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 26, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm957/.
    • October 22, 2020: The U.S. Department of the Treasury designates Iranian Islamic Radio and Television Union (IRTVU) and International Union of Virtual Media (IUVM) for being owned or controlled by the IRGC-Quds Force.“Treasury Sanctions Iranian Entities for Attempted Election Interference,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 22, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1158.
    • September 22, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Basij deputy commander Salar Anboush as a Specially Designated National.“Treasury Sanctions Iran’s Morality Police and Senior Security Officials for Violence Against Protesters and the Death of Mahsa Amini,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 22, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0969.
    • October 6, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Iranian Minister of the Interior and former IRGC-Quds Force commander Ahmad Vahidi under Executive Order 13553 for being an official of the Government of Iran and being responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Iran or Iranian citizens or residents, or the family members of the foregoing, on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in Iran. Vahidi was previously designated on June 16, 2010.“Treasury Sanctions Iranian Leaders Responsible for Internet Shutdown and Violent Crackdown on Peaceful Protests,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 6, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0994.
    • October 6, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated IRGC Deputy Political Commander Yadollah Javani under Executive Order 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC.“Treasury Sanctions Iranian Leaders Responsible for Internet Shutdown and Violent Crackdown on Peaceful Protests,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 6, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0994.
    • October 6, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated IRGC commander Hossein Nejat under Executive Order 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC. Nejat is head of Sarallah, the IRGC’s security apparatus based in Tehran tasked with quelling anti-government protests.“Treasury Sanctions Iranian Leaders Responsible for Internet Shutdown and Violent Crackdown on Peaceful Protests,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 6, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0994.
    • February 3, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control levies secondary sanctions on IRGC Navy commander Ali Reza Tangsiri for his role on the board of directors of the U.S.- and EU-sanctioned Paravar Pars Company.“Iran-related Designations and Designation Update; Non-Proliferation Designations; Counter Terrorism Designation Update,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 3, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230203.
    • February 3, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions IRGC Navy official Mohammad Sadegh Heidari Mousa for his role on the board of directors of the U.S.- and EU-sanctioned Paravar Pars Company.“Treasury Sanctions Board of Directors of Iranian UAV Manufacturer,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 3, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1246.
    • April 24, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions three individuals for having acted, or purported to act, for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC:
      • Parviz Absalan, deputy commander of the IRGC Salman Corps of Sistan and Baluchistan Province
      • Amanollah Goshtasbi, deputy Inspector of the IRGC’s Ground Forces
      • Ahmed Khadem Seyedoshohada, a brigadier general in the IRGC’s Ground Forces and a commander of the IRGC’s Karbala Operational Base.“Treasury Sanctions Senior Iranian Officials Overseeing Violent Protest Suppression and Censorship,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 24, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1436.
    • April 27, 2023: The U.S. Department of State designates the IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) for its role in the hostage-taking or wrongful detention of U.S. nationals in Iran.“Treasury Sanctions Officials of Iranian Intelligence Agency Responsible for Detention of U.S. Nationals in Iran,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 27, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1444.
    • April 27, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions four members of the IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-IO:
      • Ruhollah Bazghandi, IRGC-IO counterintelligence official
      • Mohammad Kazemi, commander of the IRGC-IO
      • Mohamad Mehdi Sayyari, IRGC-IO co-deputy chief
      • Mohammad Hasan Mohagheghi, IRGC-IO co-deputy chief brigadier general.“Treasury Sanctions Officials of Iranian Intelligence Agency Responsible for Detention of U.S. Nationals in Iran,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 27, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1444.
    • June 1, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions three members of the IRGC and Quds Force for participation in a series of terrorist plots including assassination plots targeting former U.S. government officials, dual U.S. and Iranian nationals, and Iranian dissidents:
      • Mohammad Reza Ansari, Quds Force official in Syria, for having acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Quds Force
      • Hossein Hafez Amini, a Turkey-based associate of the Quds Force, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Quds Force
      • Reza Seraj, IRGC-IO foreign intelligence chief.“Treasury Designates Iranian Regime Operatives Involved in Assassination Plots in the United States and Abroad,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 1, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1513/.

Designations by Foreign Governments and Organizations:

Ties to other extremist groups:

The IRGC-Quds Force provides training, logistical assistance and material and financial support to many extremist groups. For example:

 

Ties to foreign governments/leaders:

Media coverage/analysis of group

The international media, for the most part, agrees on the brutal nature of IRGC’s domestic action, condemning the Basij... Read More

Ismail Ghaani, Quds Force commander, June 5, 2024

“Today, Resistance throughout the region has its own independent and suitable structure and has grown step by step, and today all the elements of the resistance front are in the pursuit of righteousness against falsehood.”“Resistance forces now decision-makers in West Asia: Quds commander,” Tehran Times, June 5, 2024, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/499488/Resistance-forces-now-decision-makers-in-West-Asia-Quds-commander.

Ismail Ghaani, Quds Force commander, May 15, 2024

In response to European countries aiding Israel during an April 13 Iranian missile attack:

“All criminals should know that their actions and crimes have been recorded. France, Germany, and England should not think that that night [April 13] they came, brought their planes, and left, the matter was over and done with. Yes, that night ended, but their accountability remains.”“IRGC General Warns UK, France, Germany, and Regional Leaders,” Iran International, May 16, 2024, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405163718.

Ismail Ghaani, Quds Force commander, May 15, 2024

In response to European countries aiding Israel during an April 13 Iranian missile attack:

“France, Germany, and Britain, who promised the planes on the night of the True Promise operation, should not think that everything is over and gone. They have to be held to account still.”“IRGC Quds Force commander warns France, Germany, UK,” Mehr News Agency, May 15, 2024, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/215204/IRGC-Quds-Force-commander-warns-France-Germany-UK.

Hossein Salami, IRGC commander-in-chief, April 14, 2024

“From now on, if Israel attacks Iranian interests, figures and citizens anywhere, we will retaliate from Iran.”Susannah George, “Iran crosses old red lines and sets ‘new equation’ with attack on Israel,” Washington Post, April 14, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/14/iran-israel-attack-missiles-drones/.

Hossein Salami, IRGC commander-in-chief, April 5, 2024

During a Quds Day speech while crowds chant “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”:

“We warn that no action by any enemy concerning our holy establishment [the Islamic Republic] will go unanswered.”“IRGC warns Israel attacks ‘won’t go unanswered’ as Iran marks Al-Quds Day,” Al Jazeera, April 5, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/5/irgc-warns-israel-attacks-wont-go-unanswered-as-iran-marks-al-quds-day.

Hossein Salami, IRGC commander-in-chief, April 5, 2024

During a Quds Day speech while crowds chant “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”:

“The Zionists and their American backers believe that the more they kill Muslims and besiege and displace them, the better their lives will be, but the reality is the exact opposite.”“IRGC warns Israel attacks ‘won’t go unanswered’ as Iran marks Al-Quds Day,” Al Jazeera, April 5, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/5/irgc-warns-israel-attacks-wont-go-unanswered-as-iran-marks-al-quds-day.

IRGC communication, March 11, 2024

Letter written by Brigadier General Majid Kazemi, head of the IRGC’s Intelligence Security Organization, to Colonel Mohammad Sajedifar, the deputy of cultural and psychological operations of the IRGC Ground Force:

“Given the recent developments in the issue of Palestine and the psychological impact of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation on Palestinian communities in European and American countries, it was determined to implement significant support measures for April 15 and other rallies with the aim to achieve political isolation [of Israel].”“Leaked Document Reveals IRGC’s Role In Global Anti-Israel Campaign,” Iran International, April 15, 2024, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202404158853.

Hossein Salami, IRGC commander-in-chief, January 31, 2024

“These days in between the words of American officials we hear some unnecessary threats. We tell them, you have tested us in the battlefield and we have tested you. We will not leave any threat unanswered. While we are not seeking war, we are also neither afraid nor running away from war.”Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran Tries to Avoid War With U.S. After Stoking Mideast Conflicts,” New York Times, February 1, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/01/world/middleeast/iran-us-war.html.

Hossein Salami, IRGC commander-in-chief, August 19, 2023

“Today America is declining more than ever and the enemy is at the peak of weakness. If we take a look at the recent 45-year history, we will see that as we move forward, our enemies are getting weaker and we and the axis of resistance are getting stronger.

…

“Hezbollah has become stronger and its equipment and tools have become better and more up-to-date.”Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran’s IRGC boasts successes with Palestinians, Hezbollah,” Jerusalem Post, August 19, 2023, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-755414.

Daily Dose

Extremists: Their Words. Their Actions.

Fact:

On May 8, 2019, Taliban insurgents detonated an explosive-laden vehicle and then broke into American NGO Counterpart International’s offices in Kabul. At least seven people were killed and 24 were injured.

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