Fact:
On May 8, 2019, Taliban insurgents detonated an explosive-laden vehicle and then broke into American NGO Counterpart International’s offices in Kabul. At least seven people were killed and 24 were injured.
During the past decade and a half, extremist non-state actors in Russia have become a central element of the violence-oriented transnational right-wing extremist milieu. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and, particularly, its re-invasion of the country in 2022 have afforded these actors far greater opportunities to operate and increase their influence than before. This blog is the second in a series in which CEP aims to highlight some of the key actors, analyze their extremist ideology, their modus operandi, and transnational role.
The Other Russia of E. V. Limonov is a Russian extremist group that follows National Bolshevism and has a paramilitary wing called the Interbrigades, also known as “National Bolsheviks” in media reports. The group has a decentralized hierarchy and an ideological base that combines elements from a wide-ranging list of extremist ideologies. This enables the group to fundraise, recruit from a broad spectrum of society, and engage in violent and non-violent activities in- and outside Russia. These are described below.
Financing
The Other Russia seems to be financed entirely from donations and membership dues. The Interbrigades accept donations in cryptocurrency, as well as into their bank accounts at Sberbank and through the faster payment system (SBP) at Tinkoff Bank. In the past, the Interbrigades have managed to collect $1,000 in one day, and have also collected around $8,000 for reconstruction efforts in Donbas. The Interbrigades are public about how they spend donations, including for the purchase of military equipment for their own members as well as fighters of the Luhansk and Donetsk militias.
The Interbrigades regularly donate military and medical equipment to separatist fighters. Given the group’s critical stance on the current war strategy of the Kremlin, it is unlikely that it receives direct funding from the Russian government, but it has organized collection points in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Irkutsk, Severodvinsk, Syktyvkar, and other cities of the Russian Federation without interference from Russian authorities.
Recruitment
Both the group and its paramilitary wing use social media networks to recruit members and fighters. The group claims to have over 50,000 members, and its VKontakte page has 25,000 followers. Its ranks include former members of the National Bolshevik Party (NBP), and the group organizes larger-scale meetings in Moscow attended by all regional branches.
Interestingly, the party also has a history of attending and organizing pro-democracy rallies, such as the 2009 Strategy-31 protests and the 2006-2007 Dissenter’s March. Given its authoritarian ideology, it is likely that it uses these events for recruitment and gaining legitimacy. In 2011 and 2012, Limonov declared his intention to run for elections to the State Duma, despite the group not being able to obtain an official status as a political party in Russia.
The group appears to mainly target adolescents and young adults with its propaganda—it advocates for lowering the voting age to 14, considers young people the most oppressed social demographic—and its punk aesthetic appeals to the young. Photos from group meetings also feature many young people.
Training
In 2014, the Interbrigades formed a subdivision in the Zarya Battalion, which operates under the umbrella of the militia of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic. Recruits of the Zarya Battalion come from Russia and Latvia. It is likely that the Interbrigades do not offer formal paramilitary training of their own, but rather cooperate with militias of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic.
In 2014, the Interbrigades engaged in battles in Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, and their members also fought in Syria in 2018. Therefore, it is likely that some of their fighters have combat experience. After the Russian re-invasion of Ukraine in 2022, members of the Interbrigades began serving in various units of the Donetsk and Luhansk militias, such as the Cossack brigades and the 132nd motorized brigade in Donetsk. Some fighters of the Interbrigades have even been awarded medals by the Russian government.
As far as political activism is concerned, Other Russia administers several regional centers in Russia that spread the group’s ideology online and offline. Russian police have raided several of these centers, such as in Orenburg, St. Petersburg, and Vladivostok.
History
Violent History
Conclusion
Other Russia has not yet been designated as an extremist organization by the Russian government, and while members are occasionally arrested, the Kremlin appears to tolerate its activities in Ukraine. Despite Other Russia’s public criticism of the Kremlin, Russian security and judicial authorities have not moved against the group or banned it, in marked difference to anti-war protesters. Indeed, several members have gone to fight in Ukraine to avoid being brought before court in Russia. It may be argued that the group, or at least its paramilitary wing, and the Russian government are temporarily in an uneasy alliance. It remains to be seen how sustainable this cooperation will be going forward.
Extremists: Their Words. Their Actions.
Fact:
On May 8, 2019, Taliban insurgents detonated an explosive-laden vehicle and then broke into American NGO Counterpart International’s offices in Kabul. At least seven people were killed and 24 were injured.
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